The first point is we misjudged them, and I think we're misjudging today the geo-political intentions of our adversaries. And we exaggerated the dangers to the U.S. of those adversaries.
Second mistake. We viewed the people and leaders... in terms of our own experience. We're still doing that. We totally misjudged the political forces within that country.
Thirdly, we underestimated the power of nationalism to motivate people. Then we underestimate the power of ... ?ism? (inaudible) to motivate a people to fight and die for their people.
Fourthly, our misjudgments of friend and foe alike reflected our profound ignorance of a history, culture and politics of the people in that area, and the personalities and habits of their leaders
Fifth, forsaken lesson. We failed then as we have since to recognize the limitations of modern high technology military equipment and forces in doctrine in confronting unconventional highly motivated people's movements. And we ... would do? (inaudible) well to adapt our military tactics and our political programs to the task of winning the hearts and minds of people from a totally different culture.
Sixthly, ... We failed to draw Congress and the American people into a full and frank discussion and debate of the pros and cons of large scale U.S. military involvement.
And seventh, after the action got underway, and unanticipated events forced us off our planned course, we fail to retain popular support, in part, because we hadn't explained fully what was happening and why we had to do what we did. A nation's deepest strength lies not in its military strength, military force. It lies in the unity of its people.
Eight, we didn't recognize that neither our people nor our leaders are on a mission. To this day we seem to act in the world as though we know what's right for everybody. We think we're on a mission. We aren't. We weren't then and we aren't today. Where our security is not at stake, not directly at stake, narrowly defined, then I believe that our judgement of what is in another people's interest, should be put to the test of open discussion, open debate, and international forum. And we shouldn't act unilaterally militarily under any circumstances. And we shouldn't act militarily in conjunction with others until that debate has taken place. We don't have the God-given right to shape every nation to our own image. (applause)
Ninth, we didn't hold to the principal that U.S. military action other than in response to direct ... threats? (inaudible) to our own security should be carried out only in conjunction with international forces who are going to share in the cost. And I don't mean financial cost, although I certainly include financial cost, but I mean primarily the blood cost, the blood risk.
Tenth, we failed to recognize that in international affairs, as in other aspects of life, there may be problems which there are no immediate solutions, certainly no military solutions.
And finally underlying many of these ten mistakes lay our failure to organize the top echelons of the executive branch to deal effectively with the extraordinarily complex range of problems that we were facing. Political issues, military issues.
Robert McNamara - In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam
April 25, 1995
Link from The No-Spin Zone.
I have been disturbed recently that two friends seem to have been drinking the xenophobic Kool-aid that we are in WW4 against a billion Muslims. The 9/11 hijackers "did not fly into the World Trade Center to protest the Bill of Rights. They want us off sacred Saudi soil and out of the Middle East" as John Buchanan(!) writes.
This is not a Crusade and invading Tehran to change it's government would make matters worse, not better.
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