Woodward: The early jump on the war

The revision of the war plan on the fly on Wednesday, which was described by numerous well-placed government sources, fit a pattern established in January 2002, when Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and U.S. Central Command chief Gen. Tommy R. Franks began drafting the blueprint for war.

Over the ensuing 14 months, in a series of what these sources described as seemingly endless, often excruciating two- to three-hour sessions in Rumsfeld's office and in secure video conference calls between the Pentagon and Franks's headquarters in Tampa, the Pentagon planners came up with more than 20 versions of the plan. In all, Bush received a dozen detailed briefings as it evolved.

Was a direct attack on the Iraqi leader legal? Administration lawyers quickly determined that the Dora Farm compound where Hussein was located was a command-and-control facility subject to military attack, and since the war had begun, they determined an airstrike was legitimate.

In late February, [General] Franks introduced the idea of opening the war with a large, secret deployment of [300+] Special Operations teams in Iraq [to join CIA and special forces already there]. He argued this could be done with stealth for 48 hours before Iraq and the world realized the United States had started the war.

According to sources, the president was initially uncomfortable with this idea because he had said publicly that he would announce when he had decided to go to war. But the military advantages of the Special Operations mission were significant enough that Bush used deliberately vague language Monday when he delivered his ultimatum for Hussein to leave Iraq by Wednesday. If Hussein ignored the demand, the president said, he would commence military action "at a time of our choosing."