Tuesday, July 22, 2003

Macbeth and the Forged Documents of Niger


U.S. Congressman, Henry Waxman, has raised questions about the forged Niger documents since March 2003. This focus points to a number of speeches in which the U.S. President falsely charges that Iraq was trying to buy uranium oxide from Niger. These charges were included in administration speeches despite CIA and U.S. State Department intelligence officials objections. Robert Joseph2 , of the National Security Council, has been named as a liaison between the White House and the CIA in one such incident. There are reports that he argued to include the allegation that Iraq was trying to purchase uranium from Africa in the President's State of the Union speech.

Did the Bush administration try to create the appearance of an Iraqi nuclear weapons capacity to use as a legal pretext for the war against Iraq? Articles by Seymour Hersh in the "New Yorker" in the March 31, 2003 ( Who Lied To Whom?) and May 12, 2003 ( War and Intelligence) issues describe the controversy between the official intelligence bodies in the U.S. and the creation of the Office of Special Plans (OSP) in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The charge of this special office, it appears, was to create a pro war analysis for the President's office, regardless of the data and analysis of the official intelligence services.

Similar offices are reported to have been created in the British government, and in the Israeli government. In the U.S., the OSP functioned without the oversight and procedures that the official agencies had to comply with. This was an office outside of Congressional oversight provisions.

How could forged Niger documents circulate inside the U.S. government for several months without being detected? Why weren't they recognized as forgeries and the source of the forgeries sought, rather than presenting them as evidence to the IAEA in February 2003?

"For shame. My Lord, none shall dare to call a King to account."

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